Este esboo da artefactualidade da natureza e do aparelho de produo corporal nos ajuda a um outro ponto importante: a corporeidade da teoria. Abrumadoramente, a teoria corporal e a teoria literal. A teoria no sobre assuntos distantes do corpo vivido; Pelo contrrio. A teoria qualquer coisa menos desencarnada. As declaraes mais lindas sobre a descontextualizao radical como a forma histrica da natureza no capitalismo tardio so tropos para a encarnao, a produo, a literalizao da experincia nesse modo especfico. Esta no uma questo de reflexo ou correspondncia, mas de tecnologia, onde o social e o tcnico implodem um no outro.

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Also, in the forest are about , people of mixed ancestry, partly overlapping with the indigenous people. Making their living as petty extractors-of gold, nuts, rubber, and other forest products-they have a history of many generations in the Amazon. It is a complex history of dire exploitation. These people are also threatened by the latest schemes of world banks or national capitals from Brasilia to Washington. Their presence in the forest might be the fruit of the colonial fantasies of the bandeirantes, romantics, curators, politicians, or speculators; but their fate is entwined intimately with that of the other always historical inhabitants of this sharply contested world.

It is from these desperately poor people, specifically the rubber tappers union, that Chico Mendes, the world-changing activist murdered on December 22, , came. Indigenous people are resisting a long history of forced "tutelage," in order to confront the powerful representations of the national and international environmentalists, bankers, developers, and technocrats. The extractors, for example, the rubber tappers, are also independently articulating their collective viewpoint.

Neither group is willing to see the Amazon "saved" by their exclusion and permanent subjection to historically dominating political and economic forces. As Hecht and Cockburn put it, "The rubber tappers have not risked their lives for extractive reserves so they could live on them as debt peons" p. Forest people seek legal recognition of native lands and extractive reserves held under the principle of collective property, worked as individual holdings with individual returns" p.

The core matters are direct control of indigenous lands by native peoples; agrarian reform joined to an environmental program; economic and technical development; health posts; raised incomes; locally controlled marketing systems; an end to fiscal incentives for cattle ranchers, agribusiness, and unsustainable logging; an end to debt peonage; and police and legal protection.

Hecht and Cockburn call this an "ecology of justice" that rejects a technicist solution, in whatever benign or malignant form, to environmental destruction. Nature and justice, contested discursive objects embodied in the material world, will become extinct or survive together. Theory here is exceedingly corporeal, and the body is a collective; it is an historical artifact constituted by human as well as organic and technological unhuman actors.

Actors are entities which do things, have effects, build worlds in concatenation with other unlike actors. Other actors, human and unhuman, regularly resist reductionisms. The powers of domination do fail sometimes in their projects to pin other actors down; people can work to enhance the relevant failure rates. Social nature is the nexus I have called artifactual nature. The human "defenders of the forest" do not and have not lived in a garden; it is from a knot in the always historical and heterogeneous nexus of social nature that they articulate their claims.

Or perhaps, it is within such a nexus that I and people like me narrate a possible politics of articulation rather than representation. It is our responsibility to learn whether such a fiction is one with which the Amazonians might wish to connect in the interests of an alliance to defend the rain forest and its human and non-human ways of life-because assuredly North Americans, Europeans, and the Japanese, among others, cannot watch from afar as if we were not actors, willing or not, in the life and death struggles in the Amazon.

In a review of Fate of the Forest, Joe Kane, author of another book on the tropical rain forest marketed in time for Christmas in , the adventure trek Running the Amazon ,34 raised this last issue in a way that will sharpen and clarify my stakes in arguing against a politics of representation generally, and in relation to questions of environmentalism and conservation specifically. In the context of worrying about ways that social nature or socialist ecology sounded too much like the multi-use policies in national forests in the United States, which have resulted in rapacious exploitation of the land and of other organisms, Kane asked a simple question: "[W]ho speaks for the jaguar?

I care a great deal; in fact, I think I and my social groups are particularly, but not uniquely, responsible if jaguars, and many other non-human, as well as human, ways of life should perish. Then I understood why. His question was precisely like that asked by some pro-life groups in the abortion debates: Who speaks for the fetus?

What is wrong with both questions? And how does this matter relate to science studies as cultural studies? Who speaks for the jaguar? Who speaks for the fetus? Both questions rely on a political semiotics of representation. The effectiveness of such representation depends on distancing operations. The represented must be disengaged from surrounding and constituting discursive and non-discursive nexuses and relocated in the authorial domain of the representative. Indeed, the effect of this magical operation is to disempower precisely those-in our case, the pregnant woman and the peoples of the forest-who are "close" to the now-represented "natural" object.

Both the jaguar and the fetus are carved out of one collective entity and relocated in another, where they are reconstituted as objects of a particular kind-as the ground of a representational practice that forever authorizes the ventriloquist. Tutelage will be eternal. The represented is reduced to the permanent status of the recipient of action, never to be a co-actor in an articulated practice among unlike, but joined, social partners.

Everything that used to surround and sustain the represented object, such as pregnant women and local people, simply disappears or re-enters the drama as an agonist. For example, the pregnant woman becomes juridically and medically, two very powerful discursive realms, the "maternal environment" Hubbard, Pregnant women and local people are the least able to "speak for" objects like jaguars or fetuses because they get discursively reconstituted as beings with opposing "interests.

One set of entities becomes the represented, the other becomes the environment, often threatening, of the represented object. The only actor left is the spokesperson, the one who represents. The forest is no longer the integument in a co-constituted social nature; the woman is in no way a partner in an intricate and intimate dialectic of social relationality crucial to her own personhood, as well as to the possible personhood of her social-but unlike- internal co-actor.

Who, within the myth of modernity, is less biased by competing interests or polluted by excessive closeness than the expert, especially the scientist? Whether he be a male or a female, his passionless distance is his greatest virtue; this discursively constituted, structurally gendered distance legitimates his professional privilege, which in these cases, again, is the power to testify about the right to life and death.

These are the inversions that have been the object of so much attention in science studies. Bruno Latour sketches the double structure of representation through which scientists establish the objective status of their knowledge. First, operations shape and enroll new objects or allies through visual displays or other means called inscription devices.

Second, scientists speak as if they were the mouthpiece for the speechless objects that they have just shaped and enrolled as allies in an agonistic field called science. Latour defines the actant as that which is represented; the objective world appears to be the actant solely by virtue of the operations of representation Latour, , pp. In this doubled structure, the simultaneously semiotic and political ambiguity of representation is glaring.

Then, the reader of inscriptions speaks for his docile constituencies, the objects. This is not a very lively world, and it does not finally offer much to jaguars, in whose interests the whole apparatus supposedly operates.

In this essay I have been arguing for another way of seeing actors and actants- and consequently another way of working to position scientists and science in important struggles in the world. I have stressed actants as collective entities doing things in a structured and structuring field of action; I have framed the issue in terms of articulation rather than representation.

Human beings use names to point to themselves and other actors and easily mistake the names for the things. These same humans also think the traces of inscription devices are like names-pointers to things, such that the inscriptions and the things can be enrolled in dramas of substitution and inversion. But the things, in my view, do not pre-exist as ever-elusive, but fully pre-packaged, referents for the names.

Other actors are more like tricksters than that. Boundaries take provisional, neverfinished shape in articulatory practices. The potential for the unexpected from unstripped human and unhuman actants enrolled in articulations-i. Western philosophers sometimes take account of the inadequacy of names by stressing the "negativity" inherent in all representations.

Perhaps we can, however, "articulate" with humans and unhumans in a social relationship, which for us is always language-mediated among other semiotic, i. But, for our unlike partners, well, the action is "different," perhaps "negative" from our linguistic point of view, but crucial to the generativity of the collective. It is the empty space, the undecidability, the wiliness of other actors, the "negativity," that give me confidence in the reality and therefore ultimate unrepresentability of social nature and that make me suspect doctrines of representation and objectivity.

My crude characterization does not end up with an "objective world" or "nature," but it certainly does insist on the world. These knowledges are friendly to science, but do not provide any grounds for history-escaping inversions and amnesia about how articulations get made, about their political semiotics, if you will. I think the world is precisely what gets lost in doctrines of representation and scientific objectivity.

Some science studies scholars have been terrified to criticize their constructivist formulations because the only alternative seems to be some retrograde kind of "going back" to nature and to philosophical realism. Where we need to move is not "back" to nature, but elsewhere, through and within an artifactual social nature, which these very scholars have helped to make expressable in current Western scholarly practice.

The National Geographic Society, Discover magazine, and Gulf Oil-and much philosophy and social science-would have us see his practice as a double boundary crossing between the primitive and the modern. His representational practice, signified by his use of the latest technology, places him in the realm of the modern. He is, then, engaged in an entertaining contradiction-the preservation of an unmodern way of life with the aid of incongruous modern technology. But, from the perspective of a political semiotics of articulation, the man might well be forging a recent collective of humans and unhumans, in this case made up of the Kayapo, videocams, land, plants, animals, near and distant audiences, and other constituents; but no boundary violation is involved.

The way of life is not unmodern closer to nature ; the camera is not modern or postmodern in society. Those categories should no longer make sense. Where there is no nature and no society, there is no pleasure, no entertainment to be had in representing the violation of the boundary between them.

The videotaping practice does not thereby become innocent or uninteresting, but its meanings have to be approached differently, in terms of the kinds of collective action taking place and the claims they make on others-such as ourselves, people who do not live in the Amazon. We are all in chiasmatic borderlands, liminal areas where new shapes, new kinds of action and responsibility, are gestating in the world.

The man using that camera iS forging a practical claim on us, morally and epistemologically, as well as on the other forest people to whom he will show the tape to consolidate defense of the forest. His practice invites further articulation-on terms shaped by the forest people. They will no longer be represented as Objects, not because they cross a line to represent themselves in "modern" terms as Subjects, but because they powerfully form articulated collectives.

In May of , a week-long meeting took place in Iquitos, a formerly prosperous rubber boom-town in the Peruvian Amazon. Rain forest protection was formulated as a necessarily joint human rights-ecological issue. The fundamental demand by indigenous people was that they must be part of all international negotiations involving their territories.

The controversy generated a proposal: instead of a swap of debt-for-nature, forest people would support swaps of debt-for-indigenouscontrolled territory, in which non- indigenous environmentalists would have a "redefined role in helping to develop the plan for conservation management of the particular region of the rain forest" Arena-De Rosa, Indigenous environmentalists would also be recognized not for their quaint "ethnoscience," but for their knowledge.

Nothing in this structure of action rules out articulations by scientists or other North Americans who care about jaguars and other actors; but the patterns, flows, and intensities of power are most certainly changed. That is what articulation does; it is always a non-innocent, contestable practice; the partners are never set once and for all. There is no ventriloquism here. Articulation is work, and it may fail. All the people who care, cognitively, emotionally, and politically, must articulate their position in a field constrained by a new collective entity, made up of indigenous people and other human and unhuman actors.

Commitment and engagement, not their invalidation, in an emerging collective are the conditions of joining knowledge- producing and worldbuilding practices. This is situated knowledge in the New World; it builds on common places, and it takes unexpected turns. So far, such knowledge has not been sponsored by the major oil corporations, banks, and logging interests. That is precisely one of the reasons why there is so much work for North Americans, Europeans, and Japanese, among others, to do in articulation with those humans and non-humans who live in rain forests and in many other places in the semiotic space called earth.

Outer Space: The Extraterrestrial Since we have spent so much time on earth, a prophylactic exercise for residents of the alien "First World," we will rush through the remaining three quadrants of the semiotic square. We move from one topical commonplace to another, from earth to space, to see what turns our journeys to elsewhere might take.


Donna Haraway - The Promises of Monsters

For Haraway, the Manifesto offered a response to the rising conservatism during the s in the United States at a critical juncture at which feminists, in order to have any real-world significance, had to acknowledge their situatedness within what she terms the "informatics of domination. To ground her argument, Haraway analyzes the phrase "women of color", suggesting it as one possible example of affinity politics. Using a term coined by theorist Chela Sandoval, Haraway writes that "oppositional consciousness" is comparable with a cyborg politics, because rather than identity it stresses how affinity comes as a result of "otherness, difference, and specificity". Her new versions of beings reject Western humanist conceptions of personhood and promote a disembodied world of information and the withering of subjectivity. The collective consciousness of the beings and their limitless access to information provide the tools with which to create a world of immense socio-political change through altruism and affinity, not biological unity. In her essay Haraway challenges the liberal human subject and its lack of concern for collective desires which leaves the possibility for wide corruption and inequality in the world. A world of beings with a type of shared knowledge could create a powerful political force towards positive change.


Donna Haraway


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